It’s a dastardly French plot to disrupt morale in the U.S.
I did not really hear anyone use that particular argument against allowing commuters to buy access to high occupancy vehicle lanes, often called the car-pool lanes, such as those on I-394. But the assertion contains a kernel of truth.
The idea of letting one-passenger vehicles use car-pool lanes in return for cash follows a French example. More importantly, it does serve a public purpose by motivating more efficient use of resources.
For many years, the Paris subway had a system of first-class and second-class carriages. Cars of the two classes were exactly alike in terms of furnishings, comfort and cleanliness. They were attached to each other and thus ran at exactly the same speed and made exactly the same stops. The only difference was that since the first class fare was higher, fewer people rode in first class cars so they were less crowded.
Many see providing public services such as first class Metro cars or access to faster road lanes in return for cash payments as unfair. There is, however, an economic justification for these practices, though not everyone accepts it.
Take the basic idea of car-pool lanes. They were instituted in response to the problems of road and parking congestion. Every additional vehicle on a road contributes to congestion and slows down travel for everyone, at least in a small way. Moreover, every additional vehicle funneling into an urban center adds to parking congestion downtown.
When congestion occurs, motorists want more road capacity. If more people rode in each vehicle, congestion would be less and travel times would be shorter for any given road capacity. But there is no incentive for individuals to car pool or share rides.
Any car pooling reduces congestion, but no individual car pooler reaps enough of the benefit to offset the inconvenience and loss of time associated with sharing a vehicle.
Establishing special car-pool lanes and preferential parking access for cars with two, three or more riders provides an incentive that is missing. A faster commute and easier park offset the transaction costs of finding riders. Car poolers benefit, but so do the people who drive solo, since every multi-rider vehicle filled in response to such incentives reduces congestion on remaining lanes. The external effect of car pooling is a positive one.
It is important, however, to use car pool land capacity efficiently. If the incentives offered by faster commutes and easier parking are not sufficient to overcome the inconvenience of car pooling, the money spent on special lanes will not produce optimal reductions in congestion elsewhere.
Allowing drivers who are willing to pay a toll to have access can ameliorate low use of car-pool lanes while maintaining the incentive to car pool. Officials can adjust toll levels up if the lanes fill to a point where travel times slow and lower them if excess capacity remains. Every car in the car-pool lane is one less in the regular lanes, and there still is a financial incentive to car pool. In fact, charging a toll for nonpoolers provides a precise monetary measure of the benefit of taking riders.
There is also an increase in the well-being of society if those to whom time is much more important than money are allowed to pay their way into the fast lane. Their satisfaction is increased, and barring envy of the rich sailing along in their Lexi, no one else’s satisfaction is decreased. This is a subtle point however, to which few, other than economists or philosophers, will give much weight.
It is however, the primary justification of the first- and second-class cars on the Paris Metro.
Letting people bothered by congestion pay for elbow room while letting those who value money more than an armpit-free ride pay less does result in a more satisfied overall set of riders for any given transportation system capacity. And charging for freedom from congestion does raise money for government.
Paid access to car-pool lanes is just an interim step to broader congestion-pricing measures. Any set of highways will transport more people in a day with less time lost to slow traffic if there is a monetary incentive to use the roads at off-peak hours.
With improvements in electronic transponders and other technology to charge for highway use without the expense of tollbooths, we eventually will have commuter highways where drivers will be able to pay for different levels of congestion and will face different charges at different times of the day. Commuting will be spread out over broader periods than we have now when time lost to congestion at peak times is the only incentive to drive in off-peak hours. Drivers will face more accurately the marginal cost to society that their own commuting represents. Incentives to use public transportation will be greater, and we will get greater return from our investment in highway infrastructure.
In the short run, transportation officials might look for ways to reduce the transaction costs of car pooling.
The Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C., are home to some of the most effective car-pool lane systems. In these suburbs, a system has been developed where riders spontaneously line up to catch rides with solo drivers seeking passengers to gain access to the car-pool lanes. The quid pro quo is a free ride in return for a qualifying passenger. There are no long-term pooling relationships, only a system of well-known pickup points, classified by destination, and an unwritten code of ethics for drivers and riders.
This remarkable system developed spontaneously, but Minnesota officials might try to foster a similar system in the metro area. Despite the fact that economists and transportation engineers agree that pricing schemes can improve incentives for efficient use of highways, some people will always see such measures as unfair and biased in favor of the wealthy. This is one of those cases where societal values about what is fair and what is not ultimately affects what level of goods and services society eventually enjoys.
© 2003 Edward Lotterman
Chanarambie Consulting, Inc.