Military tactics and economics are different disciplines, but insights from one can shed light on the other, especially in regard to the recent terrorist attacks in London as well as those in Madrid in 2004 and in New York on Sept. 11, 2001.
Von Clausewitz, the Prussian military analyst, argued that the objective of war is “to compel our enemy to do our will.” Compelling a nation to do your will need not entail forcing unconditional surrender as the Allies did in World War II. It need not involve occupying territory or inflicting enormous physical destruction or economic harm on one’s opponent.
It only requires inflicting enough harm that your opponent decides the costs of continued struggle are greater than the costs of complying with your demands.
On the surface, the Islamic extremists who carried out these attacks are extremely weak militarily. They could not defeat U.S. or British armed forces in open battle. Their attacks, in themselves, do not cause significant economic harm to the targeted nations. The extremists cannot occupy the United States, the United Kingdom or Spain.
They can, however, make life unpleasant for us. At some point we might decide — probably tacitly rather than openly — that we will change our policies in the way our attackers want. They will have forced us to do their will.
They may succeed because they — like guerrillas in Colombia, Peru, Vietnam or Malaysia — have an advantage in applying “economy of force.”
Economy of force is one of the nine “Principles of War” drummed into officers at all levels of training. In strict terms, it means diverting only minimally necessary resources to anything other than your principle objective. More broadly, economy of force operations are actions in which a small military force ties up or wears out a much larger force. That is precisely where the extremists’ comparative advantage lies.
There may be only a few dozen true terrorists in the United States or Britain. Perhaps only a few hundred supporters might lend them tangible aid. This angry handful can force us, however, to use hundreds of thousands of people and tens of billions of dollars to defend ourselves.
As tragic and infuriating as the bombings in London and Madrid were, the number of deaths did not exceed a few weeks’ traffic deaths. The physical damage was no greater than that of an airliner crash. Even the 3,000 or so deaths and much greater physical destruction on Sept. 11 were small compared to the population and economy of our country.
Despite the limited direct damage, the attackers have forced us to spend much larger amounts on security. More important, they motivated changes in people’s behavior. Long after 9/11, fewer people flew. Economic uncertainty motivated some firms to forgo investments in new plants or equipment that they might have made if the national outlook were rosier. The economy slowed and fewer people had work.
Extreme changes in personal and business behavior in response to attacks are just what the bombers want to accomplish. The Londoners who insist on going about their normal lives despite the bombings may only reflect English cultural traits, but their resoluteness is the best strategy for their nation.
The attackers, of course, choose their targets for maximum psychological and economic effects. Last week, TV commentators noted that since 9/11, we have spend many billions on air travel security but perhaps only a few hundred millions on train and bus security.
The obvious response is that 9/11 demonstrated hijackers could use a plane to destroy a large building and kill thousands. Trains run on tracks. No one can seize the Empire Builder in Moorhead and crash it into the IDS Tower. One could seize a bus and crash it into some target, but constructing a simple car bomb would be more effective.
The London bombers probably would have killed more people if they had smuggled the same four bombs into a Manchester United soccer game or movie theaters. They know, however, that they will damage the British economy much more if they deter urban workers from going to work than if they scare people away from recreational venues.
The fact that violent extremists have an economy-of-force advantage must not motivate us to “do their will.” We should recognize, however, that the advantage exists and govern our responses accordingly.
Homeland Security chief Michael Chertoff is entirely right that we must set priorities. Not every possible measure to improve safety is a good use of resources. We must concentrate on the greatest threats and the most effective defensive measures. But above all, we should go about our daily lives as before and not allow a few violent people to cow us into wasting resources or doing their will.
© 2005 Edward Lotterman
Chanarambie Consulting, Inc.