The best irony is unintended. I was reminded of that this week, after reading a well-argued op-ed piece in the Financial Times by Richard Shelby. The Alabama senator makes a good case that purchasing an Airbus tanker for the Air Force is a sound decision, both in military effectiveness and fiscal management. I think he is right.
But it is hard not to laugh when he piously asserts that “Politics should have no place in the Department of Defense’s acquisition process.” I doubt the good senator would be writing such op-ed pieces if the Airbus-Northrop Grumman-European Aeronautic Defence and Space Co. consortium had not strategically chosen his home state for the plant to assemble the new tanker.
Nor is his plea for keeping politics out of procurement supported by his noting that 230 different suppliers in 49 different states will make components for the tanker. One wonders which state is so politically impotent that it failed to get even one ladleful from the tanker procurement gravy train.
Shelby is the senior member of the Senate’s appropriations committee. That alone probably was a consideration in Alabama getting the assembly plant. He either knows that or is extremely naïve.
Moreover, there is no doubt that if Shelby represented the state of Washington, home of many Boeing facilities; Kansas, where the Boeing tanker would have been assembled; or Illinois, home to Boeing’s corporate headquarters, he would be singing off an entirely different sheet of music.
The hard fact is that politics have played a role in buying U.S. weapons systems since March 1794, when Congress appropriated $688,888.82 to build six frigates. Politics dictated they be built in six different shipyards from New Hampshire to Virginia.
Little has changed over two centuries, except that military hardware producers have become more adept at spreading component contracts around to secure as much political support as possible. Low-population states like Wyoming and North Dakota don’t have large manufacturing bases. But each has two senators and a representative in Congress. There usually is a factory in such states that can make simple die castings or assemble wiring harnesses. If not, one can be opened if doing so adds a couple more votes.
Once one bidder starts playing this game, all others must also. If Boeing had gotten the nod, a similarly large set of suppliers in as many states would have benefited. In some cases, the same firm was lined up as a subcontractor for both of the competing tankers.
Such gamesmanship seems inevitable. It usually drives up the cost of the hardware purchased, but no one in Congress seems to mind that, nor is there a groundswell of opposition from voters or taxpayers.
Like earmarking appropriations for local pork projects, political influence in military procurement seems inevitable. The best one can hope for is that Congress minimizes the scope and degree of such influence. Independence on the part of the agencies that have to choose between competing proposals helps. So does an autonomous audit agency like the Government Accountability Office. Finally, the media can shed light on the process. But don’t kid yourself, buying weapons systems will never be free of politics.
© 2008 Edward Lotterman
Chanarambie Consulting, Inc.