Maybe I am overly critical, but a recent headline, “Budgeting for snow clearance is often based on calculated risk,” struck me as silly beyond belief. The article scolded Washington, D.C., for not having snow-removal capabilities equal to Chicago’s, and even implied that Pensacola officials bordered on negligence by not having snowplows since it recently snowed only 40 miles north of that Florida city.
But if city officials don’t calculate relative risks when allocating scarce resources, voters need to act. Pensacola’s eschewing snowplows is about as bad a lapse as my hometown of St Paul’s failure to thoroughly plan for the next hurricane to strike here. Our tsunami contingency preparations are even worse. And we are not remotely ready for the day when the sun burns out or for a widespread psoriasis epidemic. Imagine the heartbreak that could ensue from such imprudence!
To be fair, however, the same article also pointed out that while citizens of cities such as Baltimore or Washington, D.C., get angry when their municipal government does little to remove snow, most voters don’t want to pay the extra taxes that would be required to buy machinery used only occasionally.
Moreover, the right expenditure on preparation for infrequent disasters is a judgment call. Miami clearly should not buy any snowplows. Buffalo, N.Y., which gets more than 90 inches of snow in a typical year, clearly should have large snow-removal capacity. But what is right for Atlanta, with three inches, or Baltimore, with 21?
Some economists argue that we underinvest in emergency-response capacity, that the economic cost of the disruptions suffered by East Coast cities this winter, amortized over time, would have paid for more response capacity than the cities actually acquired. But budgets are strained and voters don’t place much value on investments against contingencies.
The eventual cost of inadequate contingency preparations may be extreme. Many are appalled by the damage in Haiti. Most California cities would suffer much less damage from an equal quake and have much more capacity for rescue and recovery.
But the frequency of quakes in Haiti is similar to that of quakes around New Madrid, Mo. The four Missouri quakes between Dec. 16, 1811, and Feb. 7, 1812, were the worst in recorded history for the lower 48 states. Some were felt over more than 50,000 square miles and as far away as Boston.
Similar quakes inevitably will occur again. When one does, Memphis, Tenn., 125 miles to the south, or St. Louis, 165 miles north, might suffer enormous damage. Yet neither city spends much on quake contingency planning. Nor does either require much in the way of earthquake resistance in local building codes.
The damage a large hurricane might cause in New Orleans was predicted again and again, but the city’s contingency preparation investments clearly were inadequate.
Such nonchalance mimics that of individuals in their own planning. People in San Francisco or Miami were unwilling to pay extra for even inexpensive earthquake- or hurricane-resistant construction until building codes required them. And virtually none of the Baltimore or Washington residents currently upset with city hall ever bought a snowblower. People are not as coldly rational in calculating cost-benefit ratios as some economists believe them to be.
© 2010 Edward Lotterman
Chanarambie Consulting, Inc.