Events in Tunisia and Egypt support an old observation that people are more likely to revolt against an oppressive government when levels of living are getting better than when they are at rock bottom.
This phenomenon of a “revolution of rising expectations” was accepted wisdom when I first encountered it 42 years ago, but it meshes better with contemporary microeconomic theory that allows for human quirkiness than it did with economists’ long-held view of human nature as being strictly rational in all decision-making. The absence of both perfect information and cold calculation is one reason why it is so difficult to predict just when people will rise up against dictators who seem firmly entrenched in power and how things will end up.
Popular revolts against hated regimes are complex in their origins and in the dynamics of how they play out. Economic factors such as poverty, unemployment, rising food prices and glaring income inequalities usually play important roles. But so do senses of injured dignity, anger at repeated humiliations and the simple human desire to be free. These are especially strong when information about the better conditions of other peoples becomes widely known.
However, except in novels like Alexandre Dumas’ “The Queen’s Necklace” or Victor Hugo’s “Les Miserables,” revolts seldom entail the most downtrodden in society finally snapping at the inhuman conditions they must endure. The impetus usually comes from people with some education
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and at least a minor stake in the order of things. Yes, they may be outraged at the lot of the least fortunate, but they often are a few steps above destitution themselves. And the snapping point often comes when a chance for upward mobility is stifled.
That certainly was the case in Tunisia, where 26-year-old Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation touched off the protests that brought down the regime. Bouazizi had a college degree, no less, but was trying to make a living selling fruits and vegetables in the street. It was when police confiscated his stock because he did not have the required license that he made his outraged statement.
Indeed, Tunisia has long had higher levels of education, health and income than most of its North African neighbors. It long had the greatest apparent civil peace. And while outside commentators remark on its widespread poverty, Egypt’s economy had been growing at 5 percent to 6 percent over the past few years. This is below levels hit by China, Korea or Taiwan at their strongest but well above the average for most Arab countries and well above Egypt’s own sluggishness over several decades.
Yes, it seemed to many that an economic elite was capturing the growth that did occur and that the middle and lower classes benefited little. And yes, the policy “reforms” that fostered such growth and were lauded by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund included reductions in food subsidies and in make-work employment for university graduates. But on the whole, the economic situation for most levels of Egyptian society was at least marginally better than a decade ago.
The tragedy is that while pre-revolt conditions often are outrageous and the economic situation of many dire, the immediate aftermath of deposing some tyrant like Hosni Mubarak usually involves the situation getting worse rather than better.
Except in the minds of some economic theorists, there are huge transaction costs in shifting from one political and economic regime to another. Moreover, uncertainty is a disincentive not only to investment for the future but also to everyday business activity. These cut national production of goods and services and hence make it harder for most households to fulfill their own needs and wants. Right now, the prolonged struggle to depose Mubarak is cutting into some of the most vital parts of Egypt’s economy, including tourism and Suez Canal tolls.
The fault is not of those who desire freedom or at least the end to an oppressive regime. It is the fault of those who dominated for so long. But they have much at stake, in terms of money as well as political power. When such favored groups fall from power, they often are willing, like Samson, to pull down the temple with them.
Major revolutions often have some element of inevitability, and they usually take years to play themselves out. Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution of 1989 was an extreme exception. Countries like South Korea or Taiwan, where nonelected governments that ruled for decades themselves choose to initiate peaceful transitions, are worthy of emulation. But don’t expect these in the Arab world right now even if Turkey seems to be a case where a non-Arab but Moslem-majority nation pulled off something similar.
People in the United States often overemphasize the power and influence of our nation in foreign events both for good and for ill. Events are in the saddle now in Egypt and Tunisia and perhaps in several other countries. Hope that things turn out well, but recognize that this now is out of anyone’s control.
© 2011 Edward Lotterman
Chanarambie Consulting, Inc.